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This repor t  presents the results of an analysis  t o  deternine STSICentaur 
catastrophic  vehlcle response probabffi t i e s  f o r  t i e  phases of  vehicle 
f l i g h t  fm STS Lif tof f  to Centaur separation from the Orbiter.  The 
analysis  considers only category one component f a i l u r e  mdos  as contr i -  
butors to the vehicle response mode probabilities. The re levant  COR- 
ponent f a i l u r e  modes am grouped in to  one of fourteen categories  of 
potential  vehicle behavior. 6y assigning f a i l u r e  r a t e s  to each c e  
ponent, fo r  each o f  i ts  fa i lure  modes, the STSICcntaur vehicle response 
probabi \ i t i e r  i n  each phase of f l i g h t  can be calculated.  
this study will be used i n  a DOE analysis  t o  ascer ta in  the hazard ftoa 
carrying a nuclear payload on the STS. 
The results of  
. .  
. . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . .  . .  .. . * .  , .  




























Auxl l lary Power Un l t  
Centaur Integrated Support System 
External lank 
Extcrndl Tdnk Separation 
Ground Support Equl pnent 
I n t r t l a l  Upper Stage 
Hain Englnc 
%In Engine Cuto f f  
Monoatethyl Hydrazl ne 
k i n  Propulsion System 
Orbltal  Haneuvertng Sys tm 
Orb1 t e r  
Pay1 oad-Bay K i  t 
Reactlon Control System 
Range Safety C m a n d  Destruct 
SRB Separatf on 
Solld Rocket Booster 
.Space Shutt le Haln Engfnes 
Space Transport System 
Thenal Protect lon System 
Thrust Vector Control 
. . . . . .  . . . . .; . . . . . . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
GLOSSARY Ill 
1-1 1. I NTRODUCT Io)( 
2. ASSUMPTIONS AND L I M I T S  OF STUDY 2-1 
3-1 3. VEHICLE RESPONSE HOOES 
4. DATA BASE AND ASSIGNMENT OF FAILURE RATES 4-1 




6-1 . .  
R-1 
. .  . .  * .  9 .  . . . . . .  . .  .. . . . .  . .  
APPEKDIX a - CENTAUR FAILURE h0DES 
APPENDIX B - STS FAILURE MODES - (LIFTOFF TO MECO) 
APPENDIX C - STS FAILURE MODES - (MECO TO CENTAUR DEPLOYMENT) 
. 
LIST OF TABLES 












Vehicle Response Modes and Centaur F r l l u r e  Mode 
Con trl bu tors 
STS Vehlcle Response Modes - L l f t o f f  t o  MECO 
STS vehlc le  Response Modes - HECO ,to Payload 
Oepl oyntent 
Combined STS/Centaur Vehicle Response Modes 
Response Mode Fa l l u re  Rates - Inc lud lng Impact O f  
Centaur ( L i f t o f f  To Payload Deployment - Present 
Study Only) 
Response Mode F a l l u r e  Rates - Excludlng Impact o f  
Centaur 
Estlcaated 'Loss o f  Control and Tumble' (SRB Case/ 
Nozzle Fal lure)  Fal lure Rates (Frons Reference 11) 
Response Hode F a l l u r e  Rates - Excludlng Impact O f  
Centaur (HECO To Pay1 oad Deployment) 
Conbined STS/CPntaur Response Mode F a i l u r e  Rates 
( L i f t o f f  To Payload Deployment) 
I tem Fa i l u re  Modes Relevant t o  Each Vehicle Behavior 
Mode - L i f t o f f  t o  Payload Separation 





Centaur Failure Modes Contr ibut ing To SWCentaur 
Behavior Modes - Case Nos. 6, 10 and l l ( a )  o f  
Table 3-4 
F a i l u r e  Modes Contr ibut ing To STS/Centaur Behavlor 
Mode Category l l ( b )  of Table 3-4 
Fa1 1 ure !%des Gontrt but1 ng To STSICentaur Behavior 
Rode - Category 14 o f  Table 3-0 
C r l t l c a l i t y  1 Component F a i l u r e  Mode by Vehicle 












. .  
- .  f 
. .  
. .  
V 
LIST  OF TABLES 




STS Fa l lu re  Modes (KC0 To Centaur Deployment) - 
Contr lbut lng To STS/Centaur Behavior %de Category 6 
(HECO To E l  Separation) 
C-2 STS F a l l u r e  &des (HECO To Centaur Oeployment) - 
Contr ibut ing To STS/Centaur Behavtor Mode Category 6 
(Orb1 t e r / E l  Separation) 
STS Fa f lu re  Modes (HECO To Centaur Oeoloyment) - C-3 
Contr lbut in  To STS/Centaur Behavior hod@ Categories 
( 6 )  and (107 
C-4 STS F a i l u r e  Modes (MECO To Centaur Deployment) - 
Cont t ibut f  ng To SWCentaur Behavior Hode Categories 
(12) and (13) 
. .  
. .  ..;, - .  ... , . . . .  , . .  . .  . . .  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose o f  t h l s  study i s  to Getemlne the cistastroph!~ f a i l u r e  
p robab l l l t les ,  f o r  the Ca l l leo  d s s l o n ,  f o r  each l d e n t l f l e d  STSKentaur 
response mode f rn 11 f to f  f through Centaur deployment. 
Only fa l l u res  leadlng to loss o f  vehlc le  and hence the payload are 
considered. The resu l t s  o f  th is  study w i l l  be used as Input  t o  an 
analysls o f  the r l s k  assoclated w f t h  car ry lng  a nuclear payload on the 
STS. Thls nuclear payload r i s k  study i s  being undertaken by the DOE f o r  
NASA. The study approach I s  out l lned by the fo l lowing tasks: 
1. Assess which f a i l u r e  modes ( I n  add i t lon  t o  those developed 
under Contract HAS 10-9374 f o r  the STS) requ l re  t o  b: Included 
In the analysis. L I s t  such addt t lonal  f a i l u r e  modes w l t h  the 
I tem o r  Items o f  Centaur hardware Involved. Only category one 
f a i l u r e  modes w i l l  be included and t h l s  w i l l  requi re  reference 
t o  General Dynamlcs docunentation and other references as 
necessary, . .  
2. Group f a i l u r e  mcdes according t o  t h e i r  a f f e c t  on the comblned 
STS/Centaur vehicle I n  each o f  the re levant  STS/Centaur f l f g h t  . 
phases. 
. .  . .  . .  , . . .  . .  . .  . . . .  .. . .  
3 .  Assign :allure rates t o  each hardware component cont r ibu t ing  
t o  CatdStrOphiC f a i l u r e  i n  each o f  the f l i g h t  phases, for each 
vehlc le  response mode. 
4. Compute f a i l u r e  probabi l i  t i e s  f a r  edch cmbined STS/Centaur 
vehic le response mode ( r e s u l t i n g  from a category one f a i l u r e )  
from l i f t o f f  t o  Centaur separation f r o m  the Orbiter. 
1- 1 
Section 2 ou t l i nes  the l l r a l t s  o f  t h i s  study and l l s t s  the assumptions 
made i n  tha anr lys i r .  Certaln f a i l u r e s  were consldsred to  be outstde 
the scope o f  t h i s  analysls slnce they would n o t  pose a problea t o  the 
nuclear payload. Note t h a t  some o f  these excluded f a l l u r e t  could p lay a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  In the l l ke l l hood  t h a t  the STS will r e t u r n  to base 
safely a f t e r  the payload has been deployed. The f a i l u r e  de f i n l t l on ,  
I.e., t h a t  whlch r e s u l t s  I n  loss o f  payload, constrafned which STS 
f a i l u r e s  were t o  be Included I n  the analyslc. Once the payload has 
successful ly been deployed, a re-entry f a i l u r e  o f  the STS I s  o f  no 
consequence. 
Loss o f  payload I s  d l r e c t l y  re la tab le t o  f a i l u r e  o f  components and/or 
systems o f  the STS/Centaur. Fa l l u re  o f  c e r t a l n  c r i t i c a l  components and 
systems could lead d l r e c t l y  to  catastrophic f a l l u r e  o f  the cmblned 
vehicle. mis I s  the approach taken f n  t h i s  study, where component 
f a i  1 ures are grouped .accord1 ng t o  expected vehlc l  e response modes. 
These catastrophic vehic le  response modes are l i s t e d  i n  Section 3.  
The Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 [Reference 11, data base was used as 
a s t a r t i n g  po in t  f o r  the development o f  f a i l u r e  ra tes as ou t l i ned  I n  
* . ' . Sectton. 4 . .  The WASH-1400' study co l  l ec ted  data from numerous sources . . . 
inc lud ing W A  data. I t  I s  Important t o  p o i n t  ou t  t h a t  the WASH-1400 * ,  
data base was merely used t o  obta in  an I n d l c a t l o n  o f  su l tab le bounds f o r  
component f a i l u r e  rates. Many o f  the cotnponents used on the STS/Centaur 
compromise pumps, plpes, valves, pressure vessels, etc., whose f a l l u r e  
ra tes are expected to f a l l  withln the ranges f o r  s l m l l a r  conrponents as 
presented I n  t h e  WASH-1400 dociment. 
- .  . . .  . .  
. .  
Sectlon 5 ou t l l nes  the method o f  ca l cu la t i on  o f  the f a i l u r e  probabi l -  
I t l e s  f o r  each re levant STSJCentaur response mode which cou ld  co;rrpromlse 
the n u c l e w  payload. The method o f  ca l cu la t l on  used ce r td ln  slnpllfyfng 
assuisrptlons whlch, glvcn the expected law p rohab i l l  t y  o f  event occur- 
rence, a re  not  I l k e l y  t o  s l g n l f t c a n t l y  a f fec t  the f i n a l  resul ts .  A 
. ' 
. .  . 
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" 
previously-developed computer program was used i n  thls stage o f  the 
anal ysl s. 
F l  nal ly , Section 6 presents the resul ts  o f  thl I comb1 ned STS/Centaur 
analysl s 
. .  . .  
. .: . . . .  , .  . . .  . . . , . . . . . .  . .  
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2. ASSWTIONS AND LIMITS OF STUDY 
T ~ I S  study was I I m t t e t i  to  ca lcutat ing SWCentaur fat1ut-e response 
p r o b a b l l l t l e s  fm l i f t o f f  t o  Centaur-STS separatlon. 
’ 
The l l s t  o f  p o t e n t l a l l y  hazardous f a l l u r e s  f o r  the STS was obtained from 
the C r l t f c a l  Items L I s t  (CIL) documeiitatlon and various l n t e r f a c l n g  
systems documentatlon, etc. [References 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 71. This l i s t  
o f  STS f a i l u r e  umdes was deflned I n  prevlous J.H. Wlgglns Company 
studies under contract  NAS 10-9374. The l l s t  o f  Centaur f a l l u r e  modes 
was drawn up froin Centaur technical  descr ip t ion documentatlon [Refer- 
ences 8 and 91 and through consul t a t l o n  wlth General Dynamics personnel. 
The CIL documents f o r  the Orbl ter ,  External Tank and SRBs l l s t e d  
f a i l u r e s  a t  c r l t l c a l l t y  1, 2, 3, 1R. 2R or 3 whlch are defined as 
fo l lows [Reference 21: 
. .  CATEGORY POTENTIAL EFFECT OF FAILURE 
1 Loss.of l i f e  or vehlc le 
2 
2R 
Redundant hardware element, the fa l l u re .  o f  
which’could cause loss  o f  l i f e  or vehfcle 
Loss o f  mission; f o r  GSE, l oss  o f  vehic le 
system 
Redundant hardware element, the f a l l u r e  o f  
which could cause loss  o f  mission 
3 A l l  others 
Only Category 1 f a i l u r e s  as defined here were Included i n  t h l s  study, 
whlch Is conslstent w i t ! !  the e a r l i e r  JKI analyses. 
t lme per iod p r i o r  t o  l l f t o f f  which has n o t  been included, I.e., from To- 
45 minutes t o  To, where l l f t c f f  occurs a t  To. 
There i s  a c r i t i c a l  
This t in% per iod was 
! 2-1 
excluded by NASA froa l n l t i d l  JHU studles dnd hdS been excluded from 
t h i  s analysl s. 
For the purposes o f  thls study, the following assumptions were made: 
1. Crtttcallty 1 failures will contribute almost entirely to  
catas trophic events. 
2. Fdllure probabllltles per u n l t  time o f  STS components are 
1 ognormal ly d i  stri buted. 
3. The mission of presently unrecognlted cr i t lcal i ty  1 fallure 
modes will not slgnlflcantly affect the final results. 
4. Common cause fallures (sornnetiwes referred to  as common mode 
fallures) will not signlficantly contribute to  t h e  hazard 
potentf a1 . 
The implications of AsSumpti6n 4 are explained i n  detail i n  Reference 
10. 
1 . .  . .  . . . . .  * '  . .  
:.. . * . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  
J . .  . .  
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3. S'EHICLE RESPONSE MODES 
r .  . .  . .  
n 
For t h i s  study Centaur f a i l u r e  modes are considered to contr ibute to 
four categories of expected STS/Centaur behavior from l i f t o f f  t o  Centaur 
separatlon. These four cateqories are the fol lowing: 
e External Tank punctured 
0 F i r e  and explosion i n  payload bay and Orb i ter  tumbles to earth 
( p r i c r  t o  o r b i t  insert ion) 
. e F i r e  and explosion i n  payload bay - on o r b i t  
e Centaur recontact with Orb1 t e r  a t  separation 
Table 3-1 out l ines the relevant Centaur f a i l u r e  modes which contr ibute 
to each of the above combined vehic le response modes. The expected 
response modes o f  the STS, excluding the e f fec ts  o f  Centaur, are out- 
l i n e d  i n  Tables 3-2 and 3-3 and described i n  de ta i l  i n  References 10 and 
11. 
Table 3-4 defines a l l  potent ia l  response modes o f  the combined 
STSKentaur vehicle, from l t f t o f f  through Centaur deployment from the,  . 
'o rb i ter .  ' The carry ing of Centaur i n  the Orbi ter  payload bay does not  * 
change the vehicle response probabi l i  t i e s  previously computed f o r  case 
numbers 1, 2, 3,  4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 (see Reference 11) and 12 and 13 (see 
Reference 10) o f  Table 3-4. Cases 6, 10, 11 and 14 are e i ther  af fected 
by, or r e s u l t  d i r e c t l y  from, carry ing Centaur i n  the  Orbiter. 
cornputed vehlcle response probab i l i t ies  f o r  these l a t t e r  four cases are. 
the central  requirements o f  t h i s  study. These resul ts,  along wi th  those 
computed I n  e a r l i e r  studies, are presented i n  Section 6. 
A sunmar3 of the f a i l u r e  modes relevant t o  thls study f r o m  l i f t o f f  to 
Centaur separation frm the Orbi ter  are l i s t e d  i n  Tables A - l  through A i .  
3, 61 and C1 through C4 of the Appendix. 
are extracted from References 11 and 10, respectively.) 
. .  . .  . . . .. . . . .  
The 
(Tables el arid C1 through C4 
These tables 
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Table 3-1. Vehfcle Response Modes and Centaur Fa i lu re  Mode Contributors 
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- 
I CENTAUR FAILURE WOES COMTRIBUTIf6; ..-... I r t n i c i E  XSPONSE 
W E  1 CRITICAL TSM PERIOD TO THE W A R D ’  
EXTERNAL T A M  
PWCTJRED 
LIFTOFF TO ET SEPA- 
RATION (LIFTOFF TO 
MLfO + 16 SECS.1 
F I R E  L EXPL0S:ON I N  MECO 4 16 SECOYJS TO 
PAYLOAD BAY - ORBITER ORBIT INSERTION (END 
TWBLES TO EARTH W1 BURN) 
FAlLUhcS I N  THE FOLLOWING SYSTEHS 
YHICY PROPAtAT€ TO T H E  €XTtRNAL 
T M K  : 
0 FUEL TANKS 
@ PROPULSION 
@ T A M  PRESSURIZATJON 
0 PRESSURE REGULATION 
0 PURGE 
@ VENTING 
0 F I L L ,  DRAIN, & DW 
@ INTERWEOIATE BULKHiAD RELICF 
@ C l S S  H E L I W  SUPPLY 
0 CENTAUR H E L I W  SUPPLY 
@ REACTION CONTROL 
@ PNEUMTIC VALVE CONTROL 
0 CENTAUR SJFPGRT STRUCTURE: 
HYDRAULICS 
S M  FAILURE MODES AS FOR NO. 1. 
FIRE 6 EXPLOSION IN (4 )  E m  ow 1 euw (81  SAME FAILURE WOES u F ~ R  no. I. 
PAVLOP BAY - ON 
ORBIT  PAYLOAD BAf 
TO OPENING of 
DOORS 
( 0 )  OPEWIHG PAYLOAO (b)  WE FAILURE NODES AS F3R NO. 1 
MY DOOR3 TO OE- I I PLOYMEN; RUPTURES FIRST. EXCLUDIHG %HOSE UHiWE H2 TAW 
CENTAUR RECONTACT AT DEPLOYMENT FAIL TO SEPARATE RISE-OFF FLU10 
SEPARITIOX USl” DISCOHHECTS 
ORBITER 
’ . . .lExtarnal. tank rnd  .orbtter frl1.urc mdes which con t r i bu te  t o  t h i s  hazard (vehlc;c 
response - drtcrncll tank punctured) &re contsined fn References 10 and 11. 
*A f i r e  and cxplosicn i n  the pwload bay, r e s u l t f n g  frm d i r e c t  or propdgdted 
rupture Of Centaur fuel  tanks, could propagate d i r e c t l y  through the bate of t’re 
Orb i te r ,  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  v i r  an OnS/RCS pod o r  the win engine cmpartment. 
’This v e h l c l t  response mode i s  broken i n t o  tw d i s t i n c t  tine periods according t o  
f a i l u r e  -de cont r ibu tors .  I n  the f i r s t  t f e e  per iod  ( I ) .  the payload bay doocr are 
c losed and a l l  f a i l u r e  modes fo r  cas9 nunber 1 vehicl: response are relevant.  Once 
tnr payload bay doors are opened, an atmosphere mtt be ava i lab le  t o  support a 
f i r e  and cxplosion. I f  the hydrogen t r n t  f a i l s .  t h l s  need not lead to  d f a i l u r e  
of  the oxygen tank rnd  so. u i t h  no atnosphere. the r e s u l t  Is l i k e l y  t o  be benlgn. 
nmber  3(b), f o r  the t ine  p t r i o d  beginning when the pry lo&d bay doors open. Y i t n  the 
payload b y  d w r i  closed. howevtr. an r tmsphere  I s  @vai tab lo  Lo supoort an exp lo r lon  
f n j t l d t e d  by a hydro j c i  tan4 rupture. I f  the oxygen tank ruptures f f r s :  then t h e  
hydrogen t rnk  i s  l i k c l y  t o  f a i l  w i t h  a r e r u l t t n g  m i x i n g  of hydroc,tn and oxygen. A 
s u i t r b l t  i g n i t i o n  source could cause t h f r  p a r t i a l l y  corlflned a i x tu re  o f  p rope l lan ts  
to erplodc, even r f t h  the prylaad-bqy doors open. 
*avc w i t h  rn txptos4on In t h i s  onviromwnt. the la rge  volrrtrr? of propel lants w u l d  
r e s u l t  i n  8n crp los ion  o f  quite h l g h  y i e l d  u+ti:h WOUIC f a p r r t  conr iderable energy t o  
f r r g m n t e d  coeptnents o f  the Centeur and Orb i te r .  
‘Hydrogen trnk f a f l u r e  modes have been excluded I S  cont r ibu tors  to veh ic le  response 
Althotlsh there would be no pressure 
..’ 
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Table 3-3, STS Vehtcle Response h d e s  - HECO to Payl. .A Deployment 
. .  . . . .  . .  . .  . 
Lcir of Mrneuver- 
soilitv on a r b t t  
i n  ME COcndrtmCnt 
and Orb i te r  Tumbles 
CRITICAL T l l f f  PERIOD 
NCO t o  I1 seac ra t~on  
( W O  t o  RECO 16 
seconds 1 
During O r b i t e r r t t  
Seprrc t ion f%neuver 
( W O  + 11 s e c o n d s  
t o  end of RCS sepcr- 
rtion burn) 
nfto t o  VECO 11 
scconds 
NECO t o  o rb t t  i n t e r -  
t i o n  (end of O3Sl burn 
a .  , . * . .  
End O W 1  burn t o  
payload deployrent 
t!ECO 6 16 seconds 
t o  Orbit Inser t ion  
(end GYS1 burn) 
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r a t l u r e s  (n h t n  Pronulsian S y s t w  
r r l e a r l n p  res idua l  prop@Ilant i n t o  
a f t  YE cwaar tn*n t  and \qn t t (on  *rw 
wl th tn  #E compartment 
0 Ln2 tank rup tur@ 
0 Fat lu res  I n  the 0rbttrr;ET 
0 Fat lures  nf forward o r  8 f t  3rDl:rr 
e t n r d r r r t c n t  o w r a t i o n  of  the PSC3 
0 Faflure of the fom8rd o r  a O t  7CS 
r y s t c n  
0 Cc i l r res  of  the  W S  s v i t w s  & + c h  
wopa*yate end c ru ra  loss o( ACS 
Srpr re t ton  System 
I T  rttrctmentr 
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descrlba which partlc'ular Iten f r l l e d ,  the numbers of Items Involved, 
the types of f r l l u r e  mdts,  the s ~ b ~ y s t m s  affected ( c r l t l c , t l  t ime 
perlods) upper and lower bounds on the  l tea f a i l u r e  rates and any 
assmptlons made. 
Welghtlng factors have been Included I n  Tables A1 through A3, 81 and Cl 
through C4 t o  re f l ec t  the condltional p robsb l l l t y  that ,  glven f a f l u r e  of 
an Itera o f  hardware, a c r l t l c a l l t y  1 condl t lon w l l l  occur. For Tables 
C 1  through C4, t h l r  I s  a departure from the approach taken I n  the 
t a r l l e r  analysts (Reference 10) Because these condl t lona l  probabll- 
. I t l e r ,  provlded by NASA, were considered to  be r a a l l s t t c  f o r  the "Space 
Shutt le Range Safety Hazards Analysts" (Reference 11) l t  I s  reaSOndblt 
to be conolstent and Include them f o r  a l l  hardware I tems. These con- 
d l t l o n a l  p robab l l l t i es  are speclfled I n  the tables o f  the Appendlx using 
mnemonics as follows: 
ACT: 
Is 100 percent. 
actual. 1 9 s .  The probabll i ty o f  a c r l  t i c a l  1 ty 1 condi t lon  
PROB: probable loss. The probab i l i t y  o f  a c r l t l c a l l t y  1 con- 
d l t l o n  I s  between 5 and LOO percent, except f o r  SRB components . .  
. . * .  . .' . .  . . . . : ..*ere 1~ value bete'en 10 and LOO percent was used, 
POSS: posslble loss. The probab i l i t y  o f  a c r i t f c a l l t y  1 con- 
d l t l o n  i o  beteen 0 and 5 percent, except for SR0 components 
where a value between 0 and 10 percent was used. 
NONE: The prcbzrbl l i ty  o f  a c r i t i c a l i t y  1 condft ion i s  essential-. . 
l y  0. 
The wetghting factor i s  used as  a rculttpller on the hardHare f a i l u r e  
rate t o  obtain the ' c r l t l c a l "  fa!?ure rdte used I n  thls  imalyrlr,, 
median value of  the wefghtlng factors were used ( { . e . ,  10 t o  100 p e r c e n t . .  
The . . . 
I s  55 percent;. 
3 -8 
. t  
I 
i 
4. DATA SASE AND ASSIGWHENT OF FAILURE RATES - 
WASH-14OO'i d ~ k  SOUIYCS included 0epar'J;lent af Defmse data, NASA data 
and general i n d u s t r l a l  operating experience as wel l  as nuclear power 
p l a n t  data. The Reactor Safety StuQ assessed the data sources and 
defined the f t v e  percent lower bound and n ine ty - f i ve  percent upper bound 
on component f a i l u r e  ra tes and demand probabl? i t i e r .  The f i v e  percent 
lower bound Indicates t h a t  f l v e  percent o f  f a i l u r e  ra tes are expected to 
be found below th ls  value. The n ine ty - f i ve  percent upper bound value 
ind icates t h a t  n inc ty - f l ve  percent o f  the f a i l u r e  r a t e  valses are ex- 
pected to be found below t h l s  value. Thus, there i s  a n inety  percent 
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  the f a i l u r e  ra te values w i l l  f a l l  w i t h i n  the f l v e  
percent and n lne ty - f i ve  percent bounds. 
By comparing components o f  the STS/Centaur w i t h  those o f  s i m l l a r  com- 
ponents o f  #e WASH-1400 data base, judgments were made as to  the 
expected range of f a i l u r e  rates f o r  STS/Centaur vehfcle components. The 
expected upper and loder  bbunds o f  f a i l u r e  ra tes o f  components re levant  
t o  t h l s  study are included i n  Tables A-1 through A-3, 01 and C 1  through . * 
C4  o f  the Appendix. 
randm var iables v i w e d  as having a range o f  possible values. The exact 
nature o f  the v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  the component f a i l u r e  ra tes I s  described by , . 
the 'probabi i i t y  'ddnsi t y  ' function. The 'prob i ib i l l  ty  density functions f o r  . 
STS/Centaur component f a i l u r e  rates are assumed t o  be l o g  normal d i s t r i -  
butions. This i s  i n  keeping w i t h  the v a r i a b l l i t y  I n  f a l l u r e  ra tes found 
by the Reactor Safety Study on analyzing data from mechantcal 
components. 
Thus, the component f a i l u r e  rates are t reated as 
. .  . . . . .  
The log normal d i s t r i bu t i on ,  describing the v a r l a b i l l t y  i n  f a l l u r e  ra tes 
of components making up the SWCentaur system, i s  w r i t t e n  mathentattc- 
a l l y  IS fol lows: - 





Mode : a, exp(u-a ) 
! 
Median: 
x = exp(u+a 2 1 2 )  Mean: 
2 2 2 
Warlance: e - exp(2w+o ) [exp(o )-I) 
Where x I s  the component fa l lure ra te  i n  number o f  f a l l u r e t  per a given 
t h e  perlod; xu I s  the f a l l u r e  r a t e  upper bound and X i s  the f a i l u r e  
r a t e  lower bound. 
L 
The loga r l  thms o f  the values o f  the random var labl  es o f  a l og  normal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  are normally d is t r ibuted (1.e.. belong t o  a normal o r  
Gaussian d i s t r l b u t l o n  function). The skewedness o f  the l og  normal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  allows one t o  account f o r  rather high, o r  unl ikely,  com- . 
ponent f a l l u r e  rates. The log normal d i s t r l b u t l o n  was therefore used t o  
bound the expected f a l l  ure rate values for  STSKentaur components. 
Fa i lu re  rates were 3ssumed t o  remain constant wtth t ime.  I n  other 
w i th  t i m e  was not  consldered i n  t h i s  analysis. 
the incidence o f  burn I n  fa i lures w i l l  not  r l g n i f f c a n t l y  a f f e c t  the 
resu l ts  and (b) tha t  the incldcnce o f  wear-out f a l l u r e  w i l l  no t  s i g n l f t -  
cant ly a f fec t  the results. 
. .  . .  . . .  . . . .  words, e.g., a.shift I n  the mean value o f  a Pal lure ra te  for a component 
This &ssUmes ( a )  tha t  
I .  
5. VEHICLE RESPONSE HOD€ FAILURE PROBAflILITY CALCULATIONS 
Slnce only category 1 fa i lures are considered i n  t h i s  analysis, the 
f a l l u r e  r a t e  for each STS/Centaut response laode can be calculated from 
the following Boolean expresslon: 
i 
(1) x - x ,  u x, u x, u ' 0 .  u x, 
where Xi are t he  Ind iv fdual  component f a i l u r e  ra tes  f o r  each response 
mode and U represents tho union o f  events, 1.e.. plus I n  Boolean 
nota ti on. 
Expansion of thfr Boolean equation Into  probab i l l t y  fonn I s  obtained 
us1 ng the f o l 1  owl ng expresslon: 
. . .  . .  
, - .  
. r  
.) 
. .  
n 
"' 0 . 0  t. (-1p-1 r! P(X,) 
I-1 ' 
. . .or . .-....P (.X) = Sum of.IRdl'vf.du'n1 ptobab l l ' i t l es  - Sum of products o f  tno a t  a t i m e  
+ Sum o f  products o f  three a t  a time 
- etc. . 
e 
t Product o f  a l l  
For tm, components 
P l X )  = P(XJ + P(%,) - P(X,AX,] 
( 2 )  
. .  
( 3 )  . .  . 
5-1 
. 
where P(x,AX,) Is w r i t t e n  as P(x~ /x , )*P(x , )  
for  Independent events where failures X, and X, are not correlated 
P(X1 - P(X,) + P(X,) - P(X,)*P(X,) (4 )  
For small failure rates, terms such as P(X,)*P(X,) can be neglected. 
Then 
Neglecting 2nd and higher order tenas i n  t h i s  analysts will have 
negligible effect on t h e  final results, as the individual expected 
failure rates of. STSKentaur components are expected to be small (see 
Tables A-1 t h rough  A-3, 81, and C1 t h rough  C4 of the Appendix). 
Equation ( 2 )  neglecting 2nd and higher order terns becomes 
. .  . . .: . . . .  . .  * n . .  . .  
P(X) P(X,) 
1 =I 
This I s  the form for P(X)  used i n  t h i s  analysis. 
. .  . 
( 6 )  . 
The coiiputer program developed under contract NAS 10-9374 was used t o  
calculate the mean and SO% bounds o f  P ( X )  f o r  each combined vehicle 
response mode from l i f t o f f  t o  Centaur-STS separation. I n p u t  to the 
program is the upper and lower bounds o f  each lognomally distributed 
component fa1 1 ure rate. . 
Each response mode fall'ure probabi l i ty  can be presented as iin a-priori ... 





uncondi?!anal p robab i l i t y  and i s  on!y concerned with the event a t  t h e  t 
1.e.. i t  i s  the probab i l i t y  o f  f a i l u re  i n  the in te rva l  t to t + d t  
wi thout  any regard to  whether p r i o r  f a i l u r e  has occurred. The a- 
pos ter io r i  p robab i l l t y  i s  a conditional p robab i l i t y  and i s  a more com- 
p le te  answer since it i s  calculated wi th  regard to whether p r i o r  f a i l u r e  
has occur -ed. 
The f a i l u r e  probabilities/second as calculated by the program are the a- 
pos ter io r i  f a i l u r e  probabi l i t ies .  It w i l l ,  however, be useful to quote 
these p robab i l i t i es  over the complete t?me period dur ing which each 
response mode can occur. The equation for performing t h i s  ca lcu lat ion 
i s  derived i n  the fo l lowing manner, assuming a negative exponential 
d i s t r i bu t i on  f o r  component mortal i ty:  
. .  
( 7 )  
. .  . . .  . . , .  . Equation (7)  i s .  the a-pr io r l .p robab l l i t y  o f  f a i l u r e  i n  the  per iod T t o .  
T+t. This equation must be divided by the probab i l i t y  o f  survival up t o  
t i m e  T t o  obtain the a-posteriori p robab i l i t y  o f  fa i lu re .  
Therefore 
0 .  l - e - x t  
- A T  e P f a i  I ure 
i .e., f o r  the exponential d is t r ibu t ion  o f  mor ta l i t y  and constant f a i l u re  
r a t e  x, the equation Is ident ica l  t o  t ha t  for the cumulative probab i l i t y  
o f  f a f l u r e  from T=O t o  T=t .  I n  t h i s  analysis however, t i s  the time 





i 6. RESULTS 
The results o f  thts  study a r e  presented i n  Table 6-1. The results of 
t h e  study covering f l l g h t  phases from l i f t o f f  to MECO, which excludes 
the impact of Centaur failure modes, a r e  presented i n  Tables 6-2 and 6-3 
(taken f m  Reference 11). The r e s u l t s  of the study covering f l i g h t  
phases from MECO to payload deployment, whlch also excludes the impact 
.of Centaur f a i l u r e  modes, a re  presented In Table 6-4 (taken from Refer- 
ence 10). f a b l e  6-5 consolidated table f o r  al l  f l i g h t  phases, frm 
l i f t o f f  through payload deployment, which includes the impact of carry- 
ing Centaur In the STS. 
t e r n  o f  the t a b l e s  of  the Appendlx, re levant  to each vehicle response 
mode. 
A l l  of these tables, '6-l  through 6-5, contain the condltional f a i l u r e  
probabi l l t l es  per second frm l i f t o f f  t o  payload separation, i.e., the 
f a i l u r e  probabi l i t i es  I n  the tlme per od t t o  t+l seconds gfven t h a t  a 
f a i l u r e  has not occurred pr lor  to t. The probabi l i ty  values a re  pre- 
Table 6-6 defines the item f a i l u r e  modes, In 
. . 
. .  . .  fented. . . 0s. . *  a. Tean w i t h  upper., and . .  lower bounds, cons is ten t  w l  t h  the use of . .  
' the lognohal  d l s t r ibu t ion  t o  describe the uncertainty In component 
f a i l u r e  ra tes .  Given the nature of the uncertainty i n  an analysis  of 
this nature, a polnt estimate value would prove to be less than useful. 
The Interval f a i l u r e  probablll tles from l l f t o f f  t o  payload separation 
can be calculated using the f a l l u r e  r a t e s  of Table 6-5 arld equation 8 of 
Section 5 where t is the t1n;e perlod I n  each interval .  
frm equatlon 8 t h a t  these interval probabl l i ty  values w f l l  Increase 
w i t h  increasing value of t, i.e., the longer the In te rva l ,  the h ighe r  
the probabi 1 i t y  o f  fa i  1 ure. The i nterval f a i  1 ure probabll i t ies  have not 
been calculated here since,  a t  the t ine o f  w r i t f n g ,  the exact time 
values f o r  the Galileo f l i g h t  ( w i t h  Centaur) were not known, 
ences 8 ar,d 12 o f f e r  conflictlng in te rva l  t i n e  values,  f t w  l i f t o f f  
through pay1 oad depl oyment. ) tiowever, these i ntcrval f a i  1 urc probabf 1 - 
f t i a :  c a  be talculcte:! i n  G fe.; mfnutes uf th  the a id  o f  a ralculatxr. 
I t  is apparent - -  - 
. .  
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T a b l e  6-3. Estimated 'Loss o f  C o n t r o l  and Tumble' (SRB 
Case/Hozrle Fsllurs) Fallura dater (From 
Ref erencc 11) 
I FAILURE RATE (1/SEC,)  I 
CASE 1 CASE 2 T I N  SPAN 
( j E C . 1  (TOTAL PROBABILITY 9 2 x 10-3) (TOTAL PROBABILITY 2 x 1u-4) 
I 
0-10 7 . E - 5  7.2E-6 
1.9E-5 1.X-6 10-70 
70-125 2.6E-6 2.6E-7 
. .  . .  
. .: . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . * .  . . .  
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-- 
I t  Is worthwhile notlng s o w  lnterestlng results as outllned I n  Tables 
6-1 througn 6-5. The f i r s t  sf these Is thar the Category 6 vehlcle 
response mde probabll I t ies , for the perf od I 1  f tof  f through HECO, are 
roughly a factor of two hlgher w i t h  Centaur I n  the Orbiter payload bay 
as contrasted wl th  an empty payload bay, This Is evldent frorll d colc 
parlson of the fallure rater for case number 6 o f  Table 6-1 wlth case 
nunber 6 o f  Table 6-2. 
7he fallure rates generated f o r  case nunber 6, for the perlod HECO to 
completlon of RCS separation burn, cannot be dlrectly compared f r a r  the 
results of Table 6-1 and Table 6-4. Table 6-4, case ( a ) ,  was generated 
under a prevlous contract (Reference 10) w l t h o u t  the appllcatlon of 
welghtlng factors on the camptJnent fallure rates.* If welghtlng factors 
had been employed I n  thls earller study, the effect would have been t o  
reduce the case ( a )  (Externdl Tank Punctured) fallure probabilities 
q u i t e  signlflcantly. The appllcatlon of welghtlng factors on the cot+ 
poqent failure rates, f o r  thls combined STS/Centaur study ( b u t  not I n  
the earller STS study from MECO to payload separation), accounts for the 
apparent anomally between the results of category 6 (Table 6-1) and case ' 
( a )  of  Table 6-4 ( f o r  the period dur ing  RCS separatlon burn). 
. .  . * .  . . . . . A further comparison can be made between case number 10 of Table 6-1 a n d .  . .  
case ( d )  of Table 6-4. These are essentially the same cases, where 
number 10 of Table 6-1 i s  for the combined STS/Centaur vehicle and case 
(d )  Is for the STS only. (The fallure modes cont r ibu t lng  to case ( d )  o f  
the earller study contributed t o  case nmber 10 of thls study for  the 
combined vehicle. - All cmponent fallure rates were assigned :t weigh t ing  
factor I n  thls combined vehicle anblysis.) 
Centaur I n  the Orbiter i s  to increase the fa i lu re  rate  for case nmber" 
The effect o f  carrying 
. 
' f lhe  appl lcatfan of  weighting factors was suggested by NASA, and im- 
plemented by the J.H. Wlggfns Company, for the STS Range Safety 
Hazards Analysis (Reference 11). T h i s  analysis was coxpleted about  
21 months after the STS f a l l u r e  probnbilltfcs, frm KECO to payload 
separattnn, were produced (Reference 10). . .  . .  . 
6- 9 
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10 by a factor greater than two. "hlr dlfference would be even more 
marked than I s  evldent fm a cmparlson of Tables 6-1 (case 10) and 6-4 
(case ( d ) ) ,  I f  rrelghtlng factors had been applied to the component 
fallure rates In the earller analyrls (case ( d ) ) .  
Table 6-5 presents all fourteen comblned STS/Centaur response mode - 
failure rates from 11ftoff t o  payload deployment. Thls comblned table 
i s  an amalgamation o f  Tables 6-1, 6-2 and 6-4. 
Cases 12 and 13 o f  Table 6-5 preser.t failure rates which were computed 
from an earlfer analyslr (Reference 10). As a consequence, and because 
transporting Centaur I n  the Orbiter dld not impact cases 12 and 13, 
thelr probablllty values do n o t  reflect the Impact of welghtlng factors 
on the component fallure rates. For cases 12 and 13 of Table 6-5, 
therefore, the failure rates quoted are llkely to be h l g h  by a factor 
estimated between 2 and 5 (assuming the NASA welghtlng factors are 
Val Id). . .  L .  
One further pofnt I s  worth noting; that I s  t h a t  the results presented 
i n  Table 6-5 do not  Include the  Impact of potentlal Spacecraft failure 
modes. A1 though the inclusion of Spacecraft failure modes was outside 
the scope 'of  th i s  study;.their potentlal impact should be consfdered. 
On the posfttve slde, however, the impact o f  Spacecraft failure modes on 
the f i n a l  results, as presented I n  Table 6-5, is  likely t o  be small. 
' 
- 
I t  I s  Important t o  note t h a t  no credit has  been taken i n  t h l s  study for 
emergency procedures whfch could I n  certain clrcumstanccs m i  t i g a t e  the 
effects of certaln component failure modcs. These procedures wlll have 
i ncreasi ng chances o f  success w1 th succcs: 'vely h! gher time periods 1 n 
which action can take place. The t h e  available for  ml t iga t lng  actlons 
related t o  vehicle response modes 1 t h r o u g h  10 (Table 6-51 are relatlve- 
l y  short and, gluen the nature of these vehtcle failure modes, any 





* -  
likely to be highly relevant to vehicle behavlor mode 13. The component 
fallures listed for the aft RCS and OMS contributing to response mode 13 . 
m a y ,  I n  certaln clrcmstdnces, be clrculavented by actions of the crew. 
Although I t  was not part of the objective o f  thls stu4y to consider 
mltlgatlng actions, the results quoted must be consfdered against thls 
backdrop. 
. .  
. .  . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . .  . .  . . . . . .  . .  . a  . .  
. 
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APPENDIX A 
CENTAUR FAILURE MODES 
( L i f t o f f  t o  Centaur Deployment) 
(Contributf ng To Combined STS/Centaur Behavior Model 
Nos. 6, 10, I l i a ) ,  l l ( b )  and 14, As Outlined In Table 3-4) 
The f a i l u r e  rates quoted i n  t h i s  Appendix are i n  uni ts  
o f  hour,'1 unless otherwise stated 
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iaDie A-i. Lenraur raiiure maes ContrlDUtlng TO sTs/Centaur Behavlor Modes - 
Categories 6, 10 and l l ( a )  (Page 1 o f  8) 
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Table A-1. Centaur Fa l lu re  Woder Contrlbutlng To STS/Ccntaur Behavfor Modes - 
Categorlcs 6, 10 and l l ( a )  (Page 2 of  8)  
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FOOTNOTES FOR TABLES A-1, A-2 AND A-3 
1. Rupture of the LO2 tank Is consldered to lead dlrectly to  the 
f a1 1 ure of the LH2 t a n k  wl t h  resul t i  ng ox1 di zer propel 1 a n t  m l  XI ng 
and f i re  and explosion I n  the payload bay. Rupture o f  the LH2 t a n k  
will not  necessarily lead t o  failure of the LO2 t a n k ,  b u t  
sufflclent oxygen 1s llkely to  be present I n  the payload bay (untll 
payload bay doors opened) t o  suppor t  combustion. . 
2. Duct Includes tank-to-duct transition pieces, elbows, e k .  
3. I t  i s  assuraed that fuel and oxldlzer Is present I n  feed llnec up t o  
pre-valves only. Not concerned w l t h  ruptures of feed ducts, 
flexible jolnts, etc., downstream o f  pre-valves when Centaur Is  I n  
'Orbiter. - .  
4. Some parts of  the system are under pressure equal t o ,  or In  excess 
o f ,  4000 p . s . 1 .  Other parts under considerably less pressure ( <  
500 psi). Parts subjected to  > 4030 psi pressure are assigned a 
weighting f a c t o r  of 'probable'; parts subjected t o  << 4000 psi 
pressure are assigned a weigh t ing  factor  of 'possible.' 
. .  . .  . . . .  * '  . . . . .  . * .  . . .  - .  . . .  . .  . .  
5. These failure modes (rupture and gross leakage) are considered t o  
result I n  direct and rapid failure of  the t a n k .  They have been 
assigned a single failure rate. Relatively mall leaks are no t  
considered catastrophic, since Centaur propellants can be duniped 
and abort procedures Initiated before tank collapse occurs. Back 
up means are available for maintaining fuel t a n k  pressures i n  the 
event propel 1 ants are dumped. 
S i x  o f  the solenoid valves on the iH2 t a n k  slde and t\lco on tRe LO2 
t a n k  slde ( I n  Centaur) are under back pressure fran the tanks. 
Gross leakage i s  therefore a po ten t i a l ly  catastrophfc failure mode. 
- - 
. .  
6 .  " * 
I i ... 
. 
7. 






While Centaur i s  i n  the Orbiter, only two o f  the check valves i n  
the GH2 pressur izat fon l i n e s  a r e  under back pressure from the LH2 
tank. The r e s t  of the dormant GH2 tank pressur izat ion l ines,  
valves, and f i t t i n g s  are excluded from the analysis. 
Leakage f a i l u r e  modes have been excluded. Even i f  the system i s  
shut down (system leaks sensed from the Orb l te r )  the centaur helium 
supply, and re1 ated pressure regul a t i  on, w i  11 take over essent.i a1 
functions. 
Except for  Nos. 55, 65, 66, 69, and 72, leakage f a i l u r e  modes have 
been excluded. Even i f  the system i s  shut down (system leaks 
sensed from the Orb i ter )  t i m e  f s  avai lable,  even i n  2xtreme cases, 
t o  dump propel lants and i n i t i a t e  abort  procedures. 
requirement f o r .  tank insul.ation system purge dur ing the boost 
phase. 
There Is no 
Loss o f  :dotor purge i s  considered t o  p o t e n t l a l l y  cause explosion 
and f i r e  of the rec i r cu la t i on  pump o f  the hydraul ic system. 
.: . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  
Leakage o r  rupture, i n  cer ta in  l i n e  sections, could r e s u l t  I n  
d i r e c t  f a i l u r e  o f  the fue l  tanks. 
Venting of the LO2 tank i s  not necessary dur ing the boost phase, 
assuming the tank can absorb a l l  energy Input  when LO2 i s  
adequately mixed v ia  the e l e c t r i c a l l y  dr iven pump. 
fa i l u res  downstrewa of LO2 t a n k  vent valves are not considered t o  
be Category 1 and have been excluded from the analysis. 
Therefore, 
Ruptures or leakages downstream of the LH2 v e n t  valves could r e s u l t  
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of f i r e  and explosion. 
. 
i n  gaseous hydrogen being released t o  the Orbi ter  pay1,ad bay, w i th  - .  
. 
14. With the pyrotechnic shutoff valves on #e fill/drain and dump 
system nonnally closed (unless opened to dunp fuel i n  an abort 
mode) failures downstream of the 1st set of pyro valves (closest to  
tanks) cannot be classified as Cat 1 and therefore are excluded 
from the analysf s. 
15. Inauvertent opening of  nonnally closed fill/drain and dump valves 
is not of concern sfnce two or more valves would have to be 
affected before Inadvertent dump could occur. 
Category 1 failure mode and therefore Is excluded from the 
analysf s. 
This 1s not a 
16. Lzakage failures are excluded as contributors t!, potential 
catastrophic events. Instrumentation on the Orbiter wlll sense 
these leaks and cause shut-down of the system. Back-up means are 
available for providing essential helium supplies (Centaur helium 
system) or  essential functions i n  the event t h a t  ClSS helium i s  n o t  
avai 1 ab1 e. 
' 
. .  . . .  . . . .  17. ' If rupture occurs.m the GHe ( t a n k  pressurizatfonj side then 
concern is  for possible propagated effects. 
occurs on N2H4 (hydrazlne fuel) side then f i r e  and explosion is 
considered probable up to openfng of the payload bay doors. 
All lines are assumed to  be under approximately 100 psf pressure 
while Centat  is I n  the Orbiter. 
If rupture or leakage 
- 
18. 
19. Rupture of any one line I n  the ClSS or Centaur pneumatfc valve 
control systm will not  prevent operation o f  f i l l / d u m p  and vent 
solenoid actuators, unless the failure propagates. 
20. Inadvertent operation o f  solenoid actuation v a l v e s  o f  the valve 
control systm could result I n  inadvertent operat;on of LH2 and/or 
LO2 tank vent valves. O f  concern is tnadvertent opening-of 
normally closed vent valves, which could lead t o  excesslve venting 
and tank co1;apse. Inadvertent closure o f  normally closed valves 
is o f  no concern since redundant paths for  venting am avai lable .  
21. Failures of Centaur engine support structures have been excluded 
even though they could result i n  fa f lure  o f  Centaur fuel lines. 
i s  assumed t ha t  fuel lines a r e  empty upstream of tank pre-valves 
and so any f a i l u r e s  i n  t h i s  upstrem sec t ion  would be benign. 
I t  
22. This f a i l u r e  mode could result i n  t i l t i n g  of the spacecraft and 
f a i l u r e  of its hydrazine o r  helium b o t t l e s  which could lead t o  f i r e  
and explosion i n  the payload bay. 
: : .  
L .  . .  
. .  
i 
23. This f a i l u r e  mode could result In t l l t i n g  o f  Centaur, f a i l u r e  o f  
the LH2 tank and f i r e  and explosion i n  the payload bay. 
24. This f a i l u r e  mode could.resul t .  i n  t i l t i n g  of Centaur and f a i l u r e  of 
the LO2 tank (followed by the LHz tank) or f a f l u r e  o f  Centaur He 
bot t les .  The end r e s u l t  could be f i r e  and explosion i n  the payload 
bay* 
. .  . 
' 25'. Should the Centaur f a i l  ' t a ' separa te  fran. the orbi ter ,  because of . .  
f a l l u r e  f o r  example of the Super*Zlp, the Centaur hould be rotated 
back down i n t o  the payload bay and an abor t  sequence undertaken, 
These types of f a i l u r e  modes are therefore excluded frcxn the 
ana lys t s  s ince they a r e  not Category 1. 
Two or more adjacent deyloynent ad;pasr sprfngs would need to  f a f l  
t o  cause a recontact of Ce:\taur wi th  the deploynerrr adapter. This 
is  not a Category 1 f d l l u t e  mode and so i s  excluded from the 
analysis .  
. I  
26, Rlse-off f l u i d  dfoconnectt on l t n e s  lass than 2 inches I n  dlameter 
will not pose a potent ial  threat  f m - r e - c o n t a c t  o f  Centaur with 
the Orbl tcr  a t  separation. These mall l i n e s  are not censfdered 
strong enough to pose a threat  i f  ttiey become hung up. 
. .  . .  . . . .  . .  . .  . .  , . , . . . .  . . . .  . .  
. .  
. .  
APPENDIX B 
STS FAILURE MODES 
(L1 f t o f f  to MECO) 
(Contributing To Comblned STS/Centaur Behavior Mode 
No. 6.Ao Outllncd I n  Table 3-4)  
The f a i l u r e  rates quoted i n  this Appendix are t n  unlts  
o f  hour,'l unless othernl se stated 
. . .  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .. . .  . * .  . .  
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